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tially articulated security and surveillance measures; and, thirdly, the logics and impacts of surveillance 1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to explore empirically how contempo-
rary security and surveillance practices and technologies permeate 
the production and management of everyday urban spaces. This 
problematic is addressed from a viewpoint centred on sport mega-
event security, drawing upon empirical insights into security 
governance at the 2008 European Football Championships in Aus-
tria and Switzerland (Euro 2008). On this basis, the paper suc-
cinctly deals with three interrelated spatial logics of security and 
surveillance, relating to separation and access control, the manage-
ment of circulations, and to the internal organisation and monitor-
ing of speciﬁc spatial enclaves. Together, these three perspectives 
elucidate how surveillance, today, contributes to orchestrate urban 
life.
This analytical focus connects neatly with a growing body of re-
search that now explores the surveillance-relevant role of space 
and, in turn, the space-producing role of surveillance. A rapidly 
developing literature suggests that surveillance tends not only to 
relate to speciﬁc persons or social groups (Lyon, 2003) but also to 
select, differentiate and manage speciﬁc categories of space. 
However, whilst the importance of space as the locus, object and 
tool of surveillance has been acknowledged, there is to date little 
reﬂection aimed at bringing the existing studies together with aview to approaching the spatialities of surveillance more fully and 
systematically. This paper aims to ﬁll this lacuna.
Existing literatures on surveillance and space can be organised 
under at least three broad headings, expressing three complemen-
tary perspectives of research. It is worth outlining these in some 
detail before moving to discuss the research approach adopted 
here. This will provide the foundation for the analysis of this paper, 
which aims to elucidate the interdependences of different spatial-
ities of urban surveillance.
The ﬁrst broad direction of research addresses issues of urban 
security and surveillance from a viewpoint centred on the ‘‘splin-
tering urbanism problematics’’ (Graham and Marvin, 2001). This 
literature highlights and problematises current trends towards the 
increasing fragmentation of the urban environment into a 
patchwork of ‘‘more or less puriﬁed insides, separated from more or 
less dangerous outsides’’ (Franzen, 2001, p. 207). Studied exam-
ples range from secluded inner city zones (Coaffee, 2004) and gated 
communities (Connell, 1999) to shopping malls (Benton-Short, 
2007; Helten and Fischer, 2004), recreational facilities, lei-sure 
spaces and bunkered private homes (Flusty, 1994). Thus urban 
security and surveillance is approached as a combined problematic 
of enclosure and accessibility. Surveillance is studied and concep-
tualised as an ensemble of techniques and practices for the moni-
toring and regulation of the ﬂow of people and objects, crossing 
inner-city borderlines at particular points in space. The key issue 
here is access control, implying a spatial logic of power that
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2encloses, ﬁxes and keeps ‘‘things’’ apart (where things includ
places, people, objects, functions, etc.), based on new control an
ﬁltering techniques (Bauman, 2000, p. 115; Boyne, 2000).
One of the key lessons derived from this literature is that th
distinction between inter-state border control, and the monitorin
of spatially more diffuse ‘‘everyday borders’’ and access-poin
across the national and urban territory is increasingly blurre
(from a spatial, functional, technological and organisational view
point) and thus quite relative (Walters, 2004; Lyon, 2005; Salte
2005; Albert and Jacobsen, 2001; Amoore et al., 2008, p. 96). A
Graham puts it,
‘‘borders cease to be geographical lines and ﬁlters betwee
states (always an over-simpliﬁed idea) and emerge instead 
increasingly interoperable assemblages of control technologi
strung out across the world’s infrastructures, circulations, citi
and bodies’’ (Graham, 2010, p. 132).
Recent investigations have also explored the logics and implic
tions of spatially articulated forms of (self-)encapsulation as a wa
to manage and monitor distinct ‘‘atmospheres’’, understoo
here not in a physical but in a psycho-political sense, as joint
inhabited, self-animated spaces of togetherness (Sloterdij
2004). Concerned with the social and psycho-political logi
and implications of enclosure and separation, many of the
approaches mobilise metaphors that emphasise the intern
‘‘spherical volume’’ of the created spatial entities. Examples rang
from Don Mitchell’s ‘‘S.U.V. model of citizenship’’ (Mitchell, 2005
to Peter Sloterdijk’s ‘‘foam city’’ (Sloterdijk, 2004) and de Cauter
‘‘capsular civilisation’’ (de Cauter, 2004). Access control, from suc
a viewpoint, is seen not only to separate physical surfaces, but al
to create and to defend more or less rigid and exclusive forms 
togetherness, thus structuring the urban environment into 
patchwork of secluded ‘‘spherical conglomerates of c
isolation’’ (Klauser, 2010).
The second direction of research is concerned not so much wi
how ﬁltering and surveillance relates to spatial separation an
enclosure, but with how – and to what effects – multi-layere
‘‘surveillant assemblages’’ (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) are co
lescing around mobile objects and people themselves. Thus the ke
concern here is not access control, but the continuous localisa-tio
and management of people and objects on the move (Dodge an
Kitchin, 2007; Buhr, 2003). These studies provide much-neede
critical accounts of how emerging geographies of surveil-lan
work to align the circulation of mobile bodies, data, objects an
services with localisation, identiﬁcation, veriﬁcation an
authentication controls, and of how the practices and techniques 
surveillance engage with the key infrastructural networks that ai
to ﬁlter and manage movements within and between cities. Th
traditionally, this research perspective is concerned strongly wi
how surveillance relates to (urban) infrastructures, an emphas
that has been conﬁrmed on various grounds and from vario
perspectives (Debrix, 2001; Wekerle and Jackson, 2005
Furthermore, and especially in more recent years, increase
attention has been paid to the ‘‘surveillant capacities’’ 
increasingly mobile, ubiquitous and ‘‘smart’’ information an
communication technologies (Farman, 2011; De Souza e Silva an
Frith, 2012).
Whilst both aforementioned research directions offer importa
insights into the control and management of inner urban and/
interurban separations and connections, little attention is paid, 
most cases, to how precisely surveillance relates to, and permeate
monitored spaces themselves (enclosed enclaves, secured passag
points, high-risk buildings, etc.). For example, transport nodes suc
as airports and railway stations are studied almost exclusively 
ﬁltering points for the procession of mobility (Castells, 1996; Fulle
2002), without according the same type of attention to theinternal structuring and monitoring of these places, as securit
zones in their own right.
I do not contest the importance of border control and mobilit
management, but my feeling is that something important is ove
looked in this picture. Indeed, all too frequently the study of how
particular spaces are organised and shaped by surveillance – i
terms of their internal constitution, functioning and architectur
– becomes separated from that of surveillance as border- an
mobility-control, as if it could somehow be regarded either as
side-show or as a passive side-product to more important and fun
damental issues.
The third broad direction of research addresses precisely this r
search lacuna, studying the logics, functioning and effects of contr
and regulation in particular geographical locales, from buildings 
public squares and larger urban areas. Anna Vemer Andrezejews
offers perhaps the most sophisticated study of the imbrications 
architecture and surveillance (in factories, post ofﬁces, prison
religious camps and private homes in Victorian America) (Andrz
jewski, 2008). Other investigations have studied the spati
articula-tion of surveillance in shopping malls (Helten and Fische
2004) and football stadia (Bale, 2005; Hagemann, 2007), f
example. What matters in all these studies is how space 
(internally) organised around surveillance and how, in tur
surveillance is shaped by the speciﬁc characteristics of particul
places.
This third research perspective underscores that space must b
considered as one of the constitutive dimensions of surveillance (a
both the product and producer of relevant practices and tech
niques) rather than as a static background structure. The function
and logics of surveillance operations, their scope, their impact an
the risks they pose cannot be understood without referring to th
spaces concerned and created by their deployment and perfo
mance. Yet in most of these micro-geographical or architectura
studies, the wider picture regarding surveillance and inner or in
ter-city mobilities is lost. Therefore, one central objection is tha
such studies often ignore the broader urban, national or interna
tional networks within which the studied micro-spaces of survei
lance are positioned and monitored. In this sense, this researc
direction both contributes to, and depends on, the previously ou2. Aim of the paper
The three directions of research outlined above are not he
metically sealed and mutually exclusive. On the contrary, man
studies touch on various spatial logics and scales of surveillanc
For example, Jones’s analysis of ‘‘checkpoint security’’ (Jones, 200
and Graham’s work on ‘‘passage point urbanism’’ (Graham, 201
powerfully combine the enclosure/access-control and mobilit
management dimensions of surveillance. However, Jones an
Graham largely overlook how exactly spatial enclaves are organise
and monitored internally through everyday sur-veillance practice
In turn, many studies dealing with gated communities and oth
enclosures emphasise both the access control to, and intern
surveillance of, secluded zones. Yet such studies beg the question 
how ﬂows of people and objects are monitored, channelled an
ﬁltered on the move in between for-tiﬁed places.
Despite the wealth of insight provided by recent research on th
imbrications between space and surveillance, there is to date n
empirically grounded, systematic reﬂection about the association
and tensions between different spatialities of surveillance, combin
ing different geographical scales and spatial logics. Indeed, little
known about the dissonances and resonances between surveillanc
practices and techniques relating to enclosure and circulation, ﬁxit
and ﬂuidity, external separation and internal organisation.
3This paper contributes to ﬁlling this gap. My basic premise is that
the centrality of space to surveillance, and, in turn, the impacts of sur-
veillance on space, can only be fully grasped when the three research
directions are brought together. More speciﬁcally, the key argument I
am seeking to advance here is that surveillance (in its spatialities)
has to be studied simultaneously with regard to ﬂuidity and ﬁxity,
ﬂows and presences, circulations and enclosures, external separation
and internal organisation, because it is the articulation and reconcilia-
tion of precisely these contrapuntal pairs of logics that condition the
functioning and implications of urban surveillance today.
Therefore, the different spatialities of surveillance have to be
understood in their mutual constitution and tensions, rather than
as a matter of one being more important than the other, or as a
mere co-evolution. In addition, two further points need to be made
before explaining the empirical focus of this paper.
The ﬁrst point is of conceptual nature. As outlined above, this 
paper argues that to different degrees, and in different ways, space 
must be understood as the locus, tool and object of surveillance. Yet 
the actual key for deciphering the spatialities of surveillance is not 
to be found in space itself, but rather in the intentions and aims of 
surveillance, mediating the spatially bound control prac-tices and 
techniques (Raffestin, 1986). We have to study the inter-ests and 
aims behind surveillance to understand its intertwined (and 
conﬂicting) spatialities. Applied to my previous argument, this 
means that if surveillance (in its spatialities) has to be studied 
simultaneously with regard to ﬂuidity and ﬁxity, ﬂows and pres-
ences, external separation and internal organisation, it is because 
its very aims – ﬁltering and enclosing, separating and following, 
channelling and dispersing – are themselves fundamentally inter-
twined in mutual enhancement and conﬂict.
The second additional point relates to the question of why ana-
lysing the spatialities of surveillance really matters: Surveillance 
impacts on everyday life not merely because it implies a wide range 
of practices and techniques for the accumulation of personal 
information, but – more importantly – because it enables unique 
forms and possibilities of classiﬁcation, differentiation and prioriti-
sation, which may affect the life chances of individuals or social 
groups in ways that are often opaque to the public and that easily 
evade conventional democratic scrutiny. It is important to focus on 
the spatialities of surveillance because we may subsequently 
understand where, how, by whom and for what reasons surveil-
lance shapes urban life (Graham, 2005, p. 562).
These questions underlie the present paper, and I will show at
different stages of my analysis how surveillance in the context of
Euro 2008 produced prioritisation, differentiation and thus orches-
tration of urban life.3. Security and surveillance at sport mega events
The centrality of the arguments put forth above can only be
fully understood when speciﬁc case studies are investigated. To
do so, this paper focuses on the ﬁeld of sport mega-event security.
More speciﬁcally, my analysis draws upon empirical insights pro-
vided by a 2-year research project relating to security governance
at the European Football Championships 2008 in Switzerland and
Austria (Euro 2008). Facilitated by longstanding research collabo-
ration, the project involved ten in-depth interviews with diverse
stakeholders in the securitisation of Euro 2008 in the Swiss city
of Geneva. These stakeholders included the security coordinator
of the Euro 2008 stadium in Geneva, security personnel at Geneva
International Airport, representatives from the Ministry of Justice,
the city’s security coordinator and police ground personnel. Fur-
thermore, the research relied on the extensive and systematic
study of ofﬁcial documents (minutes of local, regional and national
executive and parliament sittings, executive responses to parlia-mentary interpellations, and ofﬁcial documents from police
sources and UEFA) and on information gathered from various local,
national and international media articles.
Regarded as the third largest recurrent sporting event in the 
world (Stadtpolizei Zürich, 2007a), the European Football Champi-
onships present important analogies to the FIFA World Cup in that 
they affect several host cities (Euro 2008 was hosted by eight cities 
in two countries: Basel, Berne, Geneva and Zurich in Switzerland; 
Innsbruck, Klagenfurt, Salzburg and Vienna in Austria), evoke sim-
ilar concern in terms of hooliganism and crowd management, and 
result in a comparable cluster of spatial enclosures across the host 
cities (Klauser, 2011). Although restricted to national football 
teams from Europe (with the exception of Israel, if qualiﬁed), the 
event is clearly global in scope and scale, in terms of fan inﬂows and 
media interest (Roche, 2000): In the eight host cities of Euro 2008 
an estimated 10 m spectators gathered between 7th and 29th June 
2008 (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, p. 12). Football 
matches were broadcast in 231 countries world-wide and were 
followed by 155 m TV viewers on average per game 
(Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, p. 12). In Austria and 
Switzerland, ca. 10,000 media representatives and journalists were 
accredited during the event. Thus there is good reason to 
understand Euro 2008 as a truly global sporting event, evoking 
important business opportunities but also raising major local, 
national and international security concern.
For the study of the intertwined spatialities of surveillance, the 
investigation of sport mega-event security presents at least three 
important advantages. Firstly, the example is of particular interest 
because of the very scope and importance of security governance in 
this context. Recent developments of the security costs for sport-
ing mega events powerfully underline this point. Security expendi-
ture for the 2004 Athens Olympics amounted to £700 million; more 
than double that for the 2000 Sydney Olympic games (Sama-tas, 
2007), whereas security arrangements at the 2012 London 
Olympics are estimated to approach £1 billion (Magnay, 2010). 
These numbers highlight that in the context of sport mega events, 
an exceptionally wide range of security issues and strategies be-
come crystallised in a speciﬁc set of layered national and urban 
geographies. As a result, the case study offers ideal conditions for 
investigating how precisely these intertwined security and surveil-
lance strategies interact with the spaces concerned by their 
deployment and performance.
Secondly, sport mega-event security serves as a particularly 
useful frame for studying new trends and best practices in the ﬁeld 
of urban surveillance. Recent investigations conﬁrmed and elabo-
rated upon the quality of sport mega events as privileged sites and 
moments for testing advanced high-tech surveillance systems, for 
developing novel (public–private and police–military) security 
collaboration and for implanting new, security-relevant legislation 
(Samatas, 2007; Boyle and Haggerty, 2009; Giulianotti and Klauser, 
2010; Fussey et al., 2011). Euro 2008 made no exception to this. In 
Switzerland, the event led not only to unprecedented military 
involvement in public safety, combined with international police 
and private security collaboration, but also to the testing of a range 
of new surveillance techniques, from mobile ﬁngerprint identiﬁca-
tion devices to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles for crowd con-
trol. Focusing on sport mega-event security not only provides a 
glimpse into future trends and best practices in this ﬁeld, but also 
allows the study of the very places and mechanisms shaping con-
temporary developments in urban security and surveillance.
Thirdly, the example is of great interest because sport mega-
event security, at its very core, condenses and accentuates one of 
the central issues that shapes contemporary security governance, 
namely, the need to reconcile and combine (in consensus and con-
ﬂict) the demands for mobility and security (Aas, 2005; Amoore, 
2006; Amoore et al., 2008). In Bern alone, a city with 130,000
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4inhabitants, more than 150,000 fans came together when Eu
2008 football games were staged in the city (Projektorganisatio
Öffentliche Hand, 2008, p. 65). Here the challenges of managin
massive densities of presence and circulation within and across u
ban space mix uncomfortably with the dilemmas involved in tr
ing to anticipate and prevent threats, while at the same tim
managing public perception of risks. At the interface of two appa
ently opposed worlds – the necessary entrance and mobility of vi
itors, spectators and ofﬁcials, and the institution of securi
measures and restrictions – the basic question is: how to keep th
host city open and moving, whilst also anticipating, monitor-in
managing and preventing the security threats at the tournament?
This challenge is not exclusive to sport mega events. However,
is of heightened relevance in this context because of the event
scale and special characteristics (density, diversity, visibility an
risk exposure). Using Euro 2008 as a case study thus offers ide
conditions for investigating how, today, densely packed ﬂow
and presences of people and objects are monitored, secured an
managed between and within cities.
In my analysis, this security problem will be related to the thre
spatial logics of surveillance outlined above: enclosure/access con
trol, mobility management and internal organisation. I will show
how security governance at Euro 2008 worked through the comb
nation and reconciliation of surveillance practices and technique
aiming to bring together and to balance the demands for organ
ising and managing ‘mass movement’ and ‘mass presence’, ﬂuidit
and ﬁxity, external separation and internal organisation.t
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g4. Structure of the case study
To address these problematics the case study of Euro 2008 tha
follows is structured into three main parts, aiming to study and t
problematise the event-related surveillance system from a pe
spective centred on access control and spatial enclosure (1), wit
a view to the differentiation, tracking and channelling of mobilitie
(2), and in relation to the internal control and organisation of my
iad security enclaves (3).
With this approach, I do not attempt to provide an exhaustiv
overview of the panoply of surveillance practices and technique
at Euro 2008; I merely propose an exploratory analysis of the inte
twined spatial logics of select surveillance measures, situated o
two main scales: the host cities of the event, and the security en
claves within these cities. Yet this approach also aims to bring t
the fore a number of more fundamental insights in contemporar
security governance. Three key issues stand out: ﬁrstly, the com
plex challenges associated with the necessary balancing and recon
ciliation of the core requirements of mobility and securit
circulation and enclosure in contemporary security governance
secondly, the ‘‘atmospheric’’ implications of spatially articulate
security and surveillance measures; and, thirdly, the logics and im
pacts of surveillance with regard to the orchestrations of urban lifre 
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-5. Enclosure and access control
5.1. Splintering urbanism
With the staging of sport mega events, entire city centres a
temporarily reconﬁgured as security landscapes. At Euro 200
RentES, a company specialising in renting out fences and oth
security installations for large-scale events, provided more than 3
km of fences to six of the eight host cities, adding to those fenc
already placed in each city (RentES, 2008, online). Thus it can b
assumed that Euro 2008 resulted in the installation of up to 20 k
of fences per city, demarcating a multitude of access-controlled spatial entities, from the stadiums to the refere
headquarters, from team hotels to fan zones and from privat
camping grounds to ‘‘ofﬁcial fan villages’’ (offering accommodatio
and attractions for fans).
Accessibility to different enclaves varied in degree and natur
from sporadic ID and luggage checks at fan zones to electronic tic
et-controls at stadiums and from body searches at training groun
to the more or less hermetic enclosure of team hotels, dependin
on the risk assessment of each team (Bundesministerium f
Inneres, 2008, pp. 61–62). Together, the examples bear strikin
testimony to the enclosure and access control problematics 
sport mega events. Event cities exemplify the splintering of th
contemporary urban environment into a wide range of more 
less hermetically enclosed and tightly access-controlled securi
perimeters that are supported by advanced surveillance technol
gies and increased numbers of security personnel (Klauser, 2011
Securing these separations became one of the main concerns f
police forces and private security staff before and during Eur
2008.
Fan zones provide the most illuminating example for the larg
scale restructuring of Swiss and Austian city centres at the even
The UEFA fan zone in Vienna, for example, covering more tha
100,000 m2 of the city centre, was surrounded by more than 4 k
of fencing (Vienna Organising Committee EURO 2008, 2008). Oth
host cities erected fencing around fan zones of similar proportion
Thus fan zones bore striking testimony to the event-relate
‘‘festivalisation’’ of urban public space (Häussermann and Sieb
1993), offering space for supporters to drink and party whil
watching the matches on giant television screens. In addi-tion the
allowed for the concentration and regulation of fans on speciﬁcal
designed and enclosed perimeters, whilst other urban are
remained less considered.
A similar interpretation can be made of stadium security ring
as a second example of the translation of event security onto th
level of urban morphology, following the need to manage a contex
of increased density and risk. Up to several hundred metres from
the stadium, depending on the city, stadium security rings const
tuted the ﬁrst fenced barrier to the stadium for arriving fan group
Restricted to holders of match tickets, accredited staff, members o
the press and other authorised persons, the area was closed to th
general public for the whole duration of the event.
In the second and third parts of my analysis I show how diffe
ent enclosures were connected to each other and monitored inte
nally. However, at this stage, I am interested predominantly in th
spatial and regulatory dynamics of access-control, stemming from
a concern for how surveillance orchestrates urban life.
5.2. Spatial and regulatory dynamics of access control
Fan zones, stadium security rings, enclosed team hotels, train
ing grounds and other secluded places stand for a particular spati
logic of surveillance. The aim is to guarantee the good functionin
of selected, enclosed and hierarchically organised portions of spac
by controlling and ﬁltering the ﬂows of people and objects crossin
their borderlines at speciﬁc access and control points.
Enclosure and access control are thus intrinsically related, an
yet they also harbour speciﬁc dilemmas. Throughout the inte
views conducted, one key issue emerged: how to seclude spac
whilst also allowing swift access for those entitled to enter. Or i
other words, how to accelerate entries, whilst also monitoring, reg
ulating and restricting access where necessary. The key issue is no
only that of ﬁxing, demarcating and fragmenting urban space, bu
also of allowing and facilitating access. Below, I seek to highligh
the sophisticated system of ﬁlters and surveillance at Euro 200
aiming to address this problem, starting with the following quota
tion dealing with accreditation and stadium security:
5‘‘The accreditation system was conceptualised and imple-
mented by EURO 2008 SA. The main objective was to identify 
every person working in the event venues. To this end, 10 cat-
egories [of workers] and about 50 sub-categories were created.
[. .  . ] On match days, access to stadia was restricted to people 
with either an accreditation or a valid ticket. Each stadium was 
subdivided into 13 different zones, relating to different 
accreditations. The Analysis and Prevention Service in the Fed-
eral Ofﬁce of Police examined more than 45’000 UEFA accredi-
tations before and during the event’’ (Projektorganisation 
Öffentliche Hand, 2008, p. 85).
The quote portrays stadium security as an exercise of differen-
tiation and categorisation. The objective is to allow access to take 
place, based on the differentiation between various types of in-
ﬂows. People are categorised according to occupation and into tar-
get groups and risk categories before being treated and monitored 
accordingly. Whilst ‘‘bad’’ inﬂows are singled out and prevented 
from entering (hooligans, political activists, etc.), ‘‘good’’ inﬂows 
are induced, facilitated and accelerated (peaceful fans, trusted 
workers and ofﬁcial delegations). This strategy relied fundamen-
tally on increased efforts in gathering, analysing and exchanging 
data, including the international HOOGAN database, information 
exchange on terrorist suspects and political extremists, etc.
(Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, pp. 61; 86).
In the quotation, accreditation and access control are ap-
proached from a perspective centred on stadium security. How-
ever, ﬁltering also occurred in and through many other places, on 
different geographical scales. ‘‘Risky’’ foreign fans encountered ac-
cess control (and denial) somewhere in between their private home 
(through requests to report to their national police during the 
tournament, or by unsuccessfully trying to book an aeroplane-or 
tournament ticket online), at the national border of the two host 
nations (Switzerland implemented 702 refusals of entry at its 
external border, 110 of which were due to active travel bans and 12 
because of registration in the HOOGAN database (Projektorgan-
isation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, p. 44)) or at the entrance gates of 
stadiums, training grounds or fan zones (through police spot checks 
and biometric ﬁngerprint identiﬁcation devices). Together, the 
examples provide a strong ﬂavour of the multi-scalar system of 
threat ﬁlters situated both within and outside the Swiss and 
Austrian national territory, implying an increased dissociation of 
surveillance-as-border-control from the territorial frontiers (Albert 
and Brock, 1996, p. 62). This ‘‘de-bordering process’’ (Rumford, 
2006; Côté-Boucher, 2008) is not exclusive to mega-event security, 
but the special conditions of, and measures at, sport mega events 
add further importance to it.
Yet to fully grasp the selection and differentiation processes re-
lated to access control, we should move beyond the databases and
exchange of information aimed at the identiﬁcation and preclusion
of the ‘‘unwanted’’ and ‘‘risky’’. Instead, we must also study the
negotiation and compromises accounting for the preferential treat-
ment of particular visitor- or worker-categories. The aim of access
control is not only whom (and how) to exclude, but also whom
(and how) to prioritise. There are at least three important points
to highlight with regard to the emerging ‘‘analytics of access
management’’.
Firstly, it is rather obvious that differentiation, categorisation
and prioritisation not only resulted from risk assessments and
security considerations, but also responded to external stipula-
tions, private interests and commercial rationales. Sport mega
events imply a wide range of ‘‘event partners’’ (sponsors, represen-
tatives from the organising committee, etc.), whose privileges are
already ﬁxed in pre-established guidelines and agreements; here
again, a variety of geographical scales are at stake. On the national
level, for example, the Austrian and Swiss governments had toprovide a series of guarantees, as early as the pre-bidding stage, 
including assurances about granting visas/work permits and the 
free importation of goods listed in UEFA’s ‘‘Schedule of 
Conditions’’ (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, pp. 100–
105). From the very start of the bidding process for Euro 2008, UEFA 
ensured that ofﬁcial delegations (such as UEFA delegates, 
delegations of na-tional teams, ofﬁcial UEFA partners, ofﬁcial LOC 
suppliers and media journalists) were provided with free visas and 
exempted of taxes linked to their professional activities in 
Switzerland and Austria.
On the urban level, UEFA guidelines stipulated a range of special 
conditions with regard to venue access (such as maximum walking 
distances for dignitaries and ofﬁcials, and special sectors for com-
mercial partners). Furthermore, according to UEFA’s ‘‘Clean Site 
Principle’’ (UEFA, undated, p. 44), UEFA requested exclusive brand-
ing rights for its sponsors in fan zones, stadium security rings and 
other ‘‘ofﬁcial sites’’ of the event, which had to be made available to 
UEFA free of any contractual obligations (including sponsorship 
agreements, leases, utilisation agreements, supplier agreements, 
etc.) (UEFA, undated, p. 44). Thus the fragmentation of urban space 
into a series of access-controlled perimeters also served to tempo-
rarily re-territorialise parts of the host cities in the interests of vis-
ibility and branding for UEFA and its commercial partners. If 
enclosures contributed to the orchestrations of urban life during 
the event, they did so for many reasons and in order to serve many 
different interests.
Secondly, it is worth highlighting that the interests shaping ac-
cess control in its foci and modalities were, inevitably, both com-
plementary and ridden with contradictions. Two examples from
my interviews, related to issues of access control and enclosure,
must sufﬁce:
 In the ﬁeld of stadium security, the need to reconcile UEFA priv-
ileges for commercial partners (for example in terms of maxi-
mum walking distances for venue access) with police security
norms (for example, to screen all vehicles approaching the
stadium).
 With regard to fan zones, the need to reconcile security-related
requirements (for example, the police’s need of space for fences
and surveillance technologies), UEFA’s interest in space for
commercial purposes, and the interests of previously estab-
lished residents and businesses.
Event security thus appears as a complex process of exchanges and 
negotiations, occurring on all levels across the hierarchy of ac-tors 
involved, aimed at balancing and reconciling diverse needs. Most of 
these negotiations, despite their implications for urban life during 
the event, remained secret and hence a priori excluded from 
democratic scrutiny. This applied for example to the negotiations 
leading to the Host City Charter, a comprehensive cooperation 
agreement between UEFA and the host cities. Only in some very 
speciﬁc cases, conﬂicts and tensions did shine through in ofﬁcial 
documents and parliamentary protocols. One example at hand can 
be found in the Final Report of the Swiss organizing committee of 
Euro 2008, which offers a surprisingly open account of the ten-
sions between UEFA’s efforts to enhance exclusive branding in fan 
zones and the claims of spatial ownership by local businesses and 
residents (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, pp. 72–73). 
Thirdly, it should be reiterated that differential access control not 
only implied databases and negotiation, but also resulted in a 
meticulously planned, spatially articulated system of ‘‘ﬁlters, valves 
and locks’’ (Hagemann, 2007). Overall, RentES installed 1400 
turnstiles along the inner and outer security rings of the eight event 
stadiums (RentES, 2008, online), offering dedicated entry points to 
fan groups of different nationalities, but also to privileged clienteles 
(VIPs, ofﬁcials, etc.). In airports, special lanes were set up
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6to accelerate customs clearance procedures for accredited player
ofﬁcials and UEFA staff (Public Authorities Project Organisatio
2007, p. 35). At fan zones, special arrangements allowed rap
access for rescue services and police, etc. Thus differential acce
control was both the product and the producer of complex spati
arrange-ments, meticulously planned and carefully coordinate
aiming to manage presences and ﬂows across the host cities of Eu
2008.
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as 6. Managing circulations
For the event’s host cities to function well, the managemen
monitoringandmaintenanceof safe andefﬁcientﬂowsare of centr
importance. The following sectiondiscusses a series of select aspec
regarding the surveillance of circulations at Euro 2008, and, in s
doing, highlights the fact that mega-event security not only implie
enclosure and ﬁltering, but also channelling and following.
6.1. ‘‘Passage points’’ and ‘‘conductive lines’’
Each Euro 2008 host city comprised a 2–4 km-long ‘‘fan mile
across the city centre. Closed off to vehicle trafﬁc during the tou
nament, fan miles connected fan sites, attractions and sponsor
installations. They were freely accessible to the public, yet closel
monitored by national and international (static and patrolling) po
lice forces, additional CCTV cameras and drones in the sky (in Zu
ich, Bern and Basel). On match days, fan miles were furthe
enlarged by a trafﬁc-free, monitored and secured corridor calle
the ‘‘walk of fans’’, linking the city’s railway station to the stadium
Before and after the football games, temporary and spatially ﬂex
ble road barriers and check points for police control of spectator
were erected on these corridors.A closer look into the security reports of Euro 2008 reveals man
other, spatially diffuse sites for the surveillance of ﬂows. Exampl
include monitored nodal points – railway stations, street crossings
passage points along lines of movement – such as in-creased poli
and private surveillance of restaurants and parking ﬁelds alon
motorways (Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2008, p. 72) – an
transport networks, with precautions taken to segregate support
groups upon airport arrival (Public Authorities Proje
Organisation, 2007, p. 35). Thus throughout the host nations an
cities of Euro 2008, major event attractions and venues were co
nected by monitored routes, through which fan ﬂows were ma
aged and trafﬁc (train, buses, cars) was channelled.
The emerging system of ‘‘conductive lines’’ and ‘‘nodal/passa
points’’ stands for a second spatial logic of surveillance that ma
onto, without being synonymous with, enclosure and access co
trol. Both logics of surveillance are punctual and linear in their sp
tial articulation (focussing on particular entrance points an
separating lines in the case of access control and enclosure, whil
working through the monitoring of passage points and conducti
lines for the management of circulations). Yet this second type 
surveillance aims not to separate and to ﬁx space, combined wi
differentiated and restricted/facilitated access, but to manage co
nections along the very circuits where groups and individuals ci
culate. Michel Foucault, in his conceptualisation of ‘‘apparatus 
security’’ (Foucault, 2009) grasps the spatiality of this kind of su
veillance with unequivocal clarity:
‘‘[the problem] is no longer that of ﬁxing and demarcating th
territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of contro
ling them, shifting the good and the bad, ensuring that thin
are always in movement, constantly moving around, contin
ally going from one point to another, but in such a way that th
inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out’’ (Fo
cault, 2009, p. 65).
What matters is channelling and guiding ﬂows of people alon
predeﬁned routes and through ﬂexible gateways, whilst al
checking bodies, belongings and behaviours (Jones, 2009, p. 81
Along these lines and points of control, some ﬂows may be inte
rupted, whilst others may be simply surveyed (Côté-Boucher, 200
p. 146). What is emerging is a temporally limited, security-relate
form of ‘‘passage-point urbanism’’ (Graham, 2010, p. 145). Th
event surveillance appears as a ‘‘programme of govern-ment 
movement’’ (Côté-Boucher, 2008), aimed at establishing routes an
passage points for channelling, tracking and monitoring as well 
facilitating and speeding up various lines and types of
7circulation, from point to point and from zone to zone. Yet com-
pared to the differentiation and categorisation of access control,
such processes of ordering (privileging and restricting) circulations
are not neutral. They raise a series of critical power issues that are
of particular importance, especially if the differential treatment of
individuals and spectator groups not only results from risk assess-
ments and security considerations, but also responds to private
interests and commercial rationales.
To further reﬁne this picture, at least three characteristics of
‘‘passage point urbanism’’ in the event-context deserve some dis-
cussion. Firstly, the spatial and temporal ﬂexibility and adaptabil-
ity of the event-related system of connections and separations
needs emphasising. Components of the system (fences of fan
zones, police check points, turnstiles around stadia, etc.) were con-
stantly rearticulated and modiﬁed during the tournament. Echoing
the marketing slogan of RentES – ‘‘logistics just in time’’ (RentES,
2008, online) – the regulatory control of urban space was adapted
constantly to the changing characteristics of the event-crowd.
Rather than a system of permanent and rigid spatially articulated
constraints, we ﬁnd a type of regulation that works through the
evaluation and combination of different parameters and interests,
thus allowing for a form of security governance that acts in differ-
ential and ﬂexible ways, based on a series of special arrangements.
The organisation and intensity of surveillance depends on the level
of risk assessed at a given time, combined with a number of other
parameters whose relations with the managed context of increased
risk, density and visibility are carefully evaluated. This conﬁrms
the sophisticated ‘‘analytics of surveillance and regulation’’ identi-
ﬁed above.
Secondly, the complex interplay of security agents, surveillance 
technologies and material objects is worth noting. Surveillance in 
mega-event cities relies on a complex and dynamic assemblage of 
people, technologies and objects (fences, police cars for road blocks, 
etc.). These ‘‘surveillant assemblages’’ (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) 
must be studied as a dynamic and complex whole in order to 
understand and to problematise the interactions (in consensus and 
conﬂict) of different spatialities of surveillance.
Thirdly, the intrinsic relationship between the two spatial logics 
of surveillance discussed so far – separations and circulations –
needs emphasising. To a large degree, the two logics complement 
each other; indeed, the example of mega-event security powerfully 
illustrates the intertwined logics of ﬁxing, enclosing and delimiting 
space on the one hand, and of managing, guaranteeing, and 
improving circulations on the other. However, in the event’s con-
text of increased density, coexistence and risk exposure, the core 
requirements for the management of enclosures and circulation, 
ﬁxity and ﬂuidity also compete with each other. For example, UE-
FA’s stipulation for fan zones to be ‘‘located in close proximity to 
the stadia on or adjacent to signiﬁcant spectator access 
routes’’ (UEFA, undated, p. 22) resulted in the issue of how to 
seclude space without impacting on circulation. In police 
documents and event reports, trafﬁc obstructions through and next 
to fan zones – with a view to spectator ﬂows and escape or rescue 
routes – were dis-cussed centrally (Stadtpolizei Zürich, 2007b; 
Republik Österreich, 2008, p. 47). Here we touch again on the issue 
of the ‘‘struggle for space’’, outlined above with regard to the 
frictions between security and commercial needs for space.6.2. Surveillance on the move
Fences cannot be repositioned and extended inﬁnitely and po-
lice road blocks only make sense in certain conditions. Thus by
contrast with a mode of surveillance of circulations that focuses
exclusively on speciﬁc passage points and conductive lines,
mega-event surveillance also aims to become mobile in space.For example, international trains transporting ‘‘risky’’ support-
ers were followed by border control guards, whilst local and regio-
nal trains were monitored by (rail) police (Projektorganisation 
Öffentliche Hand, 2008, p. 68). Across the host cities, fan groups 
were accompanied by police delegations and fan monitors from 
their own countries, whilst football teams, ofﬁcials and political 
dignitaries were piloted by police convoys (Bundesministerium für 
Inneres, 2008, p. 75). Fan zones and other areas of increased fan 
concentrations were patrolled by local, national and foreign po-lice 
(also in plain clothes), fan monitors and private security staff.
Surveillance of circulations therefore worked through a geo-
graphically and collaboratively extended security scheme, bringing
together a large chain of actors, from border control guards and
(foreign) police delegations to fan monitors and private security
staff. The carefully coordinated network of actors offered a multi-
scalar and, above all, mobile system of surveillance for accompany-
ing and managing mobile individuals, groups and activities.
Adapted to and embracing the monitored mobilities, this system
combined punctual access and passage controls with logics of sur-
veillance and regulation that were either more linear (along trans-
port routes) or planar (in fan zones, around stadiums, etc.).
The ‘‘mobile ﬁngerprint identiﬁcation system’’, deployed by the
Swiss police for identity checks in fan zones and at railway sta-
tions, provides a powerful example for the efforts towards diffused
and mobile surveillance. As Mark Hess, spokesperson for the Swiss
Federal Police, was quoted,
‘‘Mobile AFIS [Automated Fingerprint Identiﬁcation System] 
enables us to operate quickly and discreetly in busy and 
crowded areas. It’s an ideal solution for targeted border control, 
helping to protect citizens and visitors. An event like EURO 
2008, when our borders will be much busier than normal, is a 
good example of how much ﬂexibility a mobile solution can 
provide’’ (Motorola, 2008, online).
The quotation bears striking testimony to the technologically 
mediated developments towards ‘‘ubiquitous borders’’ (Graham, 
2010), thus elucidating how new technologies disrupt and deloca-
lise territorial boundaries (Aas, 2005, p. 207) and how veriﬁcation, 
identiﬁcation and authorisation becomes ever more mobile in 
space.
Whilst mobile ﬁngerprint identiﬁcation devices enabled ID 
checks throughout the urban environment, they did not allow the 
monitoring and following of large fan groups. For this purpose, 
police used mobile CCTV cameras, spotters and plainclothes ofﬁ-
cers along and within the moving fan groups, as well as helicopters 
and drones above the event cities (Stadtpolizei Zürich, 2007a). This 
provides perhaps the most powerful example accounting for the 
quest of mobile and ﬂexible monitoring techniques for crowd 
control.
7. Regulatory dynamics of internal organisation and zonal
surveillance
Mega-event surveillance implies not only a complex system of 
connections and separations, but also myriad carefully regulated 
and internally monitored perimeters of varying size, scale and 
functionality. For example, as shown elsewhere in more detail 
(Klauser et al., 2008), railway stations and airports were monitored 
not only as transit points, but also as security zones in their own 
right. Surveillance focused on these sites as both a nodal point for 
the procession, channelling and ﬁltering of ﬂows, and as a ‘‘security 
bubble’’ with its own internal activities, shops, etc. Thus event 
surveillance also worked as zonal spatial intervention of power, 
through diverse mechanisms and instruments, from sniff-ing dogs 
in stadium perimeters (Marinka, 2006, p. 4) to no-ﬂight
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8zones above the host cities (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Han
2008, p. 75).
At this point, I do not attempt to put forward an exhaustiv
analysis of zonal surveillance at Euro 2008, in all its sites and qua
ities. I merely devote some attention to a number of important ele
ments characterising the regulatory dynamics of this kind o
surveillance, so as to further elucidate the intertwined spatialitie
correlative to the management of spaces, separations and circula
tions. To do so, emphasis will be placed, again, on the example o
fan zones.
The ﬁrst point to highlight is rather obvious: namely, surve
lance practices and technologies in fan zones – from patrollin
security agents and CCTV cameras to the Scanning Infrared G
Imaging System for the detection of hazardous chemicals deploye
in Bern and Basel (Projektorganisation Öffentliche Hand, 2008, 
47) – exemplify that enclosed perimeters were not only access co
trolled, but also monitored and regulated internally. This is relate
of course, to the very purpose of fan zones, which is to ﬁx and 
concentrate presences (rather than to keep the event crowd 
‘‘tamed’’ motion such as in ‘‘fan miles’’ and the ‘‘walk of fans’’). Y
if fan zones are intended to contain, collect and protect the eve
crowd, they also rely on the ﬁltering and channelling of inﬂowin
and outﬂowing people and objects. Internal surveillance bo
complements and depends on surveillance related to enclo-su
and circulation.
Secondly, what matters with regard to the internal surveillan
of fan zones is not merely the monitoring of distinct physical su
faces, but the management of spatially anchored atmospher
(Klauser, 2010; Pavoni, 2011). Fan zones provide a space for th
collection of individual spectators into larger conglomerates 
contemplative togetherness. They constitute the territorial fram
work for the concentration of high densities of fans into colle
tively inhabited spheres of emotions and analogous ritua
Security and surveillance practices in fan zones must therefo
be understood as sphere-creating forces in their own right. In oth
words, to understand the spatialities of surveillance in fan zone
emphasis has also to be placed on the atmospheric attributes 
enclosure and internal organisation/monitoring. This is importa
precisely because space is not just a means, but also an obje
and aim of surveillance.
Thirdly, if surveillance of fan zones is to be understood as a
ensemble of atmospherically active practices and techniques, th
does not imply that fan zones were internally homogeneous an
unstructured. On the contrary, managing enclosures is relate
intrinsically to the internal structuring of space. As Bale (200
and Hagemann (2007) have shown, this comment applies forc
fully to stadium security: At Euro 2008, stadium perimeters we
subdivided into 13 different zones, as seen above. Different subd
visions matched with different routes and modalities for venue a
cess (for different fan communities, dignitaries, commerci
partners, etc.). In the case of fan zones, the principle of intern
structuring was also present, but less pronounced (access contr
was also less sophisticated). Internal structuring was reduced 
the use of ‘‘wave breakers’’ (physical barriers and obstacles, Repu
lik Österreich, 2008, p. 48) and to the erection of stands and pla
forms related to special activities and access criteria. Yet in bo
cases, internal structuring aimed towards the planned, hierarchic
and functional distribution of people and objects across the e
closed inside (Foucault, 2009, p. 20), bound up also with differe
tial access and circulation management.
The fourth and ﬁnal point I want to reiterate here is that survei
lance in fan zones differed from adjoining space not only in inten
sity, spatiality and internal organisation, but also in substance an
regulative principles. Unlike in open public space, security in fa
zones (and stadia) was delegated to Euro 2008 SA, which accom
plished the task by contracting private security companies. Constructional, technical, organisational and operational securi
aspects in fan zones thus fell under the authority of UEFA, with n
tional and international police ready to intervene if need be (Publ
Authorities Project Organisation, 2007, pp. 46–47). Yet security an
surveillance in fan zones not only implied a different source 
authority, but also relied on a different normative foundation. U
FA’s ‘‘Binding Safety and Security Instructions’’ provided a detaile
set of directives, stipulations and house rules aimed at the contr
and ‘‘disciplination’’ of the enclosed compound, following a bina
and a priori deﬁned opposition between the allowed and the fo
bidden. This set of instructions, as previously shown, responded 
both security and commercial rationales. As a result, fan zon
appear as spatially ﬁxed, separated, access-controlled and inte
nally monitored security bubbles, motivated by security conside
ations, but also by UEFA’s intentions to create a clean environme
for its ofﬁcial partners’ branding and merchandise.8. Conclusions
The paper has explored the spatial orderings around mega
event surveillance from three complementary perspectives, focus
ing on separation and access control, the management of circula
tions, and the internal organisation and monitoring of securit
enclaves.
With this analysis, I make no claim that mega-event survei
lance presents clear and simple analogies to urban security an
surveillance in ‘‘normal’’ circumstances. On the contrary, spo
mega-event security relies on increased planning and coordination
which contributes to the strict coalescence of different spatia
temporal and functional logics of surveillance within a carefull
orchestrated and comprehensive security system. Thus a variet
of measures and logics of surveillance are bound together her
more ﬁrmly and consciously than in other cases and contexts stud
ied in the existing literatures.
Despite this particularity, however, there are at least three ma
jor lessons from my analysis that need highlighting. I am doing s
with a view to embark on a broader theoretical project, aimed a
conceptualising the imbrications of power, space and surveillanc
in the contemporary world. Firstly, the framework I have deve
oped in this paper suggests some new directions for critical en
quiry into the complementarities and tensions between differen
spatialities of surveillance. The paper exempliﬁes how, at Eur
2008, different spatial logics of surveillance called on each othe
supported each other, modiﬁed and shaped each other, but also
in speciﬁc cases – conﬂicted with each other in ceaseless reciproc
ity. These complex imbrications resulted, fundamentally, from
intertwined ambitions to channel, ﬁlter and follow circulation
to enclose, ﬁx, monitor and organise spatial enclaves, and to creat
and defend spatially bound atmospheres. Although in other ci
cumstances, urban security and surveillance might not be as care
fully coordinated, there is good reason to assume that this intrins
relation between the various aims and spatialities of surveillance
of more general and hence exemplary value.
Secondly, and following from the previous point, my investig
tion illustrates in exemplary fashion the intertwined pair of im
pulses to facilitate, accelerate and promote ﬂows of people an
objects on the one hand, and to reinforce enclosures and restri
accessibilities on the other. Here, this problematic has been a
proached through the lens of mega-event security, as a world wi
either no borders (for some) or ubiquitous borders (for other
Having said this, the sophisticated regulatory dynamics of ﬁlterin
and differentiating between those allowed (and helped) to mov
and those doomed to miss out is often understood more general
as a deﬁning feature of globalisation (Bauman, 1998, p. 88). It 
therefore located at the very core of contemporary security
9governance (Aas, 2005, p. 200). For further research – focusing like
this paper on speciﬁc sites and moments in order to reveal the
micro-articulations of the two ambitions – a central challenge will
be to undertake detailed and comparative empirical investigations
into how precisely different forms, objectives and scales of ﬁltering
interact with each other. It will also be necessary to further prob-
lematise the implications this has on contemporary socio-spatial
practices and relations.
Thirdly, the present analysis illustrates powerfully that surveil-
lance operations – in their multiple and intertwined spatialities –
respond to a range of goals, from different actors. In particular,
one of the key issues emerging from my analysis relates to the role
and importance of UEFA in shaping security and surveillance at
Euro 2008, as well as in re-territorialising the event cities for pur-
poses of global branding. Therefore, more generally speaking, in
investigating the spatialities of surveillance, critical attention must
also be paid to the interests, motivations and needs mediating the
spatial articulations of speciﬁc measures and practices, its modal-
ities and, consequently, its implications on urban life.
Together, the three lessons are of critical importance if we are to
study the complex and intertwined spatialities of power and sur-
veillance along with its effects and problems. Yet self-evidently,
this problematic requires much more ﬁrst-hand research into the
everyday expressions of surveillance in (and through) space. What
I offer here – based on the contrapuntal pairs of ﬁxity and ﬂuidity,
enclosure and circulation, external separation and internal organi-
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